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portant concepts of thinking and explor-
ing reality is the notion of divine attributes: 
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THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN THE EARLY WORKS OF LLULL
I n the famous fresco The School of Athens, which Raphael († 1520) fi nished in 1511 in the Stanze della Segnatura of the Vatican, Aristotle points to the ground and Plato to the sky. These two 
fi gures seem a good symbol of how Ramon Llull († 1316) deals 
with the subject of the attributes of God: The divine attributes do 
not only serve him to speculate about God, but also to make state-
ments concerning the world and its qualities because the created 
attributes of the world are dependent on uncreated divine attributes. 
Llull’s theory of the divine attributes therefore gives an answer to 
both questions: How to speak of God? And: How to talk about the 
world?—a fundamental philosophical questioning of his time which 
is still relevant today.
Already in his fi rst major work, The Book of the Contemplation 
of God (Liber contemplationis in Deum),1 Llull designs a sophisticated 
theory of God’s attributes. Relevant here are above all chapters 
4-102 and the summarising chapter 178. In the latter Llull explains 
on the basis of the attribute of infi nitas that he arrives at determining 
the attributes of God by the method of inference from qualitates fi ni-
tas, that is to say by means of fi nite properties in the created world. 
What is true for infi nitas is transferable to all attributes because God 
expresses himself in his creation in the way he really is in himself. In 
chapter 4, for example, God’s being, according to Llull, is so great 
that human beings would never even imagine that God could be 
fi nite.2 The attributes characterize God in such a way that he could 
not be conceived without them or he would no longer be God. 
If we compare the divine attributes of chapters 4-102 with those 
listed in chapter 178 of the Liber contemplationis, Llull’s lists of the di-
vine attributes already vary within the Liber contemplationis and all the 
more in comparison with his other works. In the Liber de gentili et tri-
1. Written probably during the years of Llull’s autodidactic theological formation 
and intensive meditations that accompanied this period and fi nished approxi-
mately about 1273.
2. Cf. R. LLULL, Liber contemplationis in Deum (henceforth LC), ch. 4, 8, MOG IX 
(Häffner, Maguntia, 1740) 8: “quod tuum esse sit tam magnum quod non possit 
cadere in intellectum hominis, quod tu sis fi nitus”.
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bus sapentibus, for example, only the following seven divine attributes 
are mentioned: bonitas, magnitudo, aeternitas, potestas, sapientia, amor, 
and perfectio. In the Ars compendiosa inveniendi veritatem the number of 
attributes has been expanded to 16, whereby virtus now is a separate 
attribute and not anymore a generic term for ‘divine attribute’. Llull 
understands his lists of attributes as open lists to which attributes can 
be added or omitted, according to what Llull wants to underline in his 
argumentation. In the Liber contemplationis both lists show the distinc-
tion between the divine attributes quoad Deum (in relation to God) 
and the divine attributes quoad nos (in relation to us). 
Among the attributes quoad Deum there are classic divine prop-
erties such as infi nity (infi nitas), eternity (aeternitas), unity (unitas), 
wisdom (sapientia), goodness (bonitas), and perfection (perfectio) that 
are attributed to the divine being also by other philosophers and 
Christian thinkers. The attributes quoad nos are attributes that “we 
recognize in you with respect and in relation to the creatures”.3 Llull 
defi nes them as “those qualities by which your works are perceived”.4 
As an effect of these attributes quoad nos the attributes quoad Deum 
become immediately tangible for human beings; they even become 
their own human qualities which they possess qua creature. Yet, and 
this is the main difference, the essential properties in God manifest 
themselves in the creature as only accidental.5 For Llull not God is 
the exception to the rule, but the human being is defi cient.
ANALOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF ATTRIBUTES AS INSTRUMENT OF 
UNDERSTANDING THE WORLD 
Llull was by no means the fi rst Christian thinker who intensively 
grappled with the doctrine of attributes. The fi rst chapter of De 
3. LLULL, LC, ch. 178, 13, 424: “quas intelligimus in te secundum respectum et 
relationem ad creaturas”.
4. LLULL, LC, ch. 178, 14, 424: “illas qualitates, per quas percipiuntur tua opera”.
5. Cf. LLULL, LC, ch. 178, 18, 425: “intellectus intelligit ipsam [scil. creationem] 
quoad te non habere ullum accidens, cum aeternaliter et infi nite sis illa res, per 
quam es creator, sed creatura quoad se venit accidentaliter in esse per hoc, quod 
receperit principium”.
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divinis nominibus of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite († ca. 500) 
may pass for a classical Christian example for creating a list of attrib-
utes.6 Why is Llull so fascinated by the concept of divine attributes? 
Which insights does he gain from them?
Firstly, this concept serves him as a grid, as a scheme of order 
for viewing the world. This corresponds to the direction in which 
Aristotle points in the Scuola d’Atene. In Llull’s thinking, creation 
befi ts a particular key role. It establishes the world’s causal depend-
ency from God. God is the suffi cient reason for the world’s being 
the very way it is, because he has passed on to it his properties 
in a weaker form. This leads to an analogous relation, whereby 
‘analogous’ refers to the ontological process of ascent and descent. 
Robert Pring-Mill illustratively asks: “Given this conception of the 
universe as a Ladder of Being whose levels were wholly congruous 
with one another, if one but knew all that there was to be known 
about one level, could one not argue validly from that level to the 
other per analogiam?“7 Different levels of being correspond to dif-
ferent degrees of perfection. The divine characteristics manifest 
themselves at all levels of being to varying degrees. In his logical 
writings, Llull defi nes nine levels of existence (instrumental, el-
emental, vegetative, sensitive, imaginative, human being, heaven, 
angel, God).8 Therefore, for Llull all reality is relational and ana-
logical. Llull can operate with a relation of similarity, since for him 
creation has a representative function. In it, in a mirrored form, 
the omnipresence of the divine perfection is refl ected. This very 
point constitutes the peculiarity of Llull’s approach, for here lies 
the main difference between the Aristotelian (and scholastic) predi-
cation, which examines language in order to formalize it and to 
explore the structure of propositions, and the Llullian relations, 
6. Cf. DIONYSIUS AREOPAGITA, De divinis nominibus, in B. R. SUCHLA (ed.), Corpus 
Dionysiacum I, “Patristische Texte und Studien” 33 (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1990).
7. R. PRING-MILL, The Analogical Structure of the Lullian Art, in S. M. STERN (ed.), 
Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition (University of South Carolina Press, 
Oxford/Columbia SC, 1972) 315-326; 316.
8. Cf. R. LLULL, Logica nova, dist. I, ch. 1, n. 2, ed. CH. LOHR (Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 2002) 8.
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which investigate the (platonically understood) reality to fathom 
its ontological structures.9 
The divine attributes turn out to be at the same time prin-
cipia essendi and cognoscendi. As a basic principle analogy applies; 
thus an ascent or descent to the different levels is possible. De-
pending on whether one focuses on the order of being or the 
order of knowing, the use of the metaphor ‘ascent’ or ‘descent’ 
is appropriate. Colomer emphasizes the alignment from top to 
bottom and advocates an ontological-metaphysical perspective 
which highlights the order of being.10 This corresponds to the 
traditional position of Hugh of St. Victor († 1141) that the human 
mind descends to the visible by viewing the invisible.11 The fact 
of creation undoubtedly refers to a causal relationship between 
God and the world. Gayà emphasizes this causal relationship that 
he apostrophizes as the basis for Llull’s so-called ‘exemplarism’ 
when he speaks about the Llullian doctrine of correlatives.12 Yet 
one can go even one step further, as Platzeck explains: “When 
good brings forth good, the generating good is not only causally 
connected with the good brought forth, but also united regard-
ing its quiddity due to its goodness. In the concrete good the 
goodness appears as it were as a real binding force.”13 On this 
9. Cf. A. BONNER, Ramon Llull: relació, acció, combinatoria i lògica moderna, “SL” 
34 (1994) 51-74; 65.
10. Cf. E. COLOMER, El ascenso a Dios en el pensamiento de Ramon Llull, in P. WILP-
ERT (ed.), Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung. Vorträge 
des II. Internationalen Kongresses für Mittelalterliche Philosophie, Köln, 31. August-6. 
Sept. 1961, “Miscellanea Mediaevalia” 2 (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1963) 582-588; 582: 
“El movimiento de este pensamiento va más bien de arriba a abajo, que no de 
abajo a arriba; es decir, va de Dios con sus razones y dignidades al universo creado 
por el mismo Dios a semejanza y participación de sus propias dignidades”.
11. Cf. HUGH OF ST. VICTOR, Exegetica II: Expositio in hierarchiam coelestem S. 
Dionysii Areopagitae, lib. IX, cap. XIII, MIGNE Patrologia Latina 175, 1127BC: 
“et sic ‘a primis usque ad ultima descendens’ conducit illuminationem suam 
per singulas virtutes”.
12. Cf. J. GAYÀ, El conocimiento teológico, como precepto, según Ramon Llull, “EL” 
18 (1974) 47-51; 47.
13. E.-W. PLATZECK, Raimund Lull. Sein Leben-Seine Werke, vol. 1, “Bibliothe-
ca Franciscana” 5 (Schwann, Düsseldorf, 1962) 152: “Wenn Gutes Gutes 
hervorbringt, so ist das hervorbringende Gute mit dem hervorgebrachten 
Guten nicht nur kausal, sondern auch washeitlich auf Grund der Gutheit 
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basis, i.e. a regeneration of essence, rest both, Llull’s proofs of 
the existence of God and his predications of God. “Of God ap-
plies the praedicatio in quid. I can say that God is goodness. Of 
created things only the praedicatio in quale is valid, i.e. just the 
denominative statement: ‘The human being has goodness’ or 
‘The human being is good’. Llull’s teaching here is in all quite 
traditional.”14
GNOSEOLOGY: THE DOCTRINE OF ATTRIBUTES AS AN 
INSTRUMENT OF CONTEMPLATING GOD
The ontological causal chain ‘from top to bottom’ is a prerequi-
site for the gnoseological movement ‘from bottom to top’. This 
corresponds to the direction in which Plato points. This way of 
achieving knowledge which uses the divine attributes as principia 
cognoscendi is appropriate to the human intellect. 
From contemplating the lower level of being, we ascend to 
the comparison with the higher level of being whereby the 
latter is not given to us immediately. We can only see from 
undeceiving systems of the lower level of being (whether 
this is the outside world or our own being does not matter 
at the moment) that they point clearly to a higher being as 
higher, they point necessarily, even point to it as the only 
origin of their being, from which all facilities and attributes 
of the lower level of being result.15 
geeint und verbunden. Im konkret-Guten erscheint die Gutheit gleichsam 
wie eine real bindende Kraft”. 
14. Ibidem: “Von Gott gilt die ‘praedicatio in quid’. Ich kann sagen: Gott ist die 
Gutheit. Von den geschaffenen Dingen gilt nur die ‘praedicatio in quale’, 
d.i. eben die denominative Aussage: ‘Der Mensch hat Gutheit’ oder ‘Der 
Mensch ist gut’. Lulls Lehre ist hier in allem recht traditionell”.
15. Ibidem, 136: “Von der Betrachtung der niederen Seinsstufe steigen wir zum 
Vergleich mit der höheren Seinsstufe auf, wobei wiederum diese letzte uns 
unmittelbar gar nicht gegeben ist. Wir können lediglich aus untrüglichen 
Anlagen der niederen Seinsstufe (ob diese die Außenwelt oder unser eigenes 
Sein ist, verschlägt im Augenblick nichts) ersehen, daß sie deutlich auf ein 
höheres Sein als Höheres hinweisen, und zwar notwendigerweise hinweisen 
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As ladder of ascent function the (divine) perfections.16 The 
brothers Carreras y Artau connect this basic structure of Llull’s 
thinking explicitly with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, for God 
and the divine dignities are cause and archetype of created per-
fections, and things are nothing more than images of divine at-
tributes, equivalents of the Platonic ideas.17 
The idea of an ascent by means of the divine perfections 
cannot be found only with Llull, but also with Thomas Aquinas 
(† 1274).18 The ability that allows this ascent is reason,19 and with 
its help man can make out a variety of attributes in God; as God 
understands many creatures in one act of understanding, so our 
intellect ascending from the multiplicity of creatures to God, un-
derstands that there are many notions relating imperfectly to one 
God.20 The result of the ascent is indeed a recognizing, but only 
und dazu als auf ihren einzigen Seinsursprung hinweisen, von dem alle 
Anlagen und Eigenschaften der niederen Seinsstufe herrühren”.
16. Cf. D. BURRELL, Beyond Idolatry. On ‘Naming’ the One-God, in M. J. HIMES (ed.), 
Finding God in All Things (Crossroad, New York, 1996) 28-37; 29: “Those features 
of the world which we recognize to be perfections may be used to ascend to an 
imperfect understanding of their source because we know the world to be pat-
terned according to divine wisdom”.
17. Cf. T. and J. CARRERAS Y ARTAU, Historia de la filosofía española vol. I (Aso-
ciación, Madrid 1939) 481. 
18. Cf. THOMAS AQUINAS, Summa theologiae Iª q. 13 a. 2 co., in Thomae Aquinatis 
opera omina cum hypertextibus in CD-Rom, R. BUSA (ed.) (Editoria Elettronica 
Editel, Milano, 1996): “Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, 
et est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita quod 
repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excel-
lens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem si-
militudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut formae corporum inferiorum re-
praesentant virtutem solarem.” Also ibidem a. 3 co.: “Respondeo dicendum 
quod, sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus procedentibus 
in creaturas ab ipso”.
19. Cf. E. COLOMER, Ascenso cit., 583: “El momento crucial del método luliano 
se encuentra en la dimensión de la inteligencia”.
20. Cf. AQUINAS, De potentia cit., q. 7 a. 6 ad 5: “Ad quintum dicendum, quod 
cum omnimoda unitas sit ex parte Dei, et multiplicitas ex parte creatur-
arum, sicut oportet quod in Deo intelligente plures creaturas sit una forma 
intelligibilis per essentiam, et multi respectus ad diversas creaturas; ita in 
intellectu nostro ex multiplicitate creaturarum in Deum ascendente, oportet 
quod sint multae species habentes relationes ad unum Deum”.
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an imperfect recognition.21 Likewise Llull stresses one could rec-
ognize God, although with difficulty, something of God rather 
than nothing, but also not everything. As an obstacle during the 
ascent Llull especially emphasises the inadequacy of the human 
mind, which can never succeed in the transition from the finite 
to the infinite, rather than the being imprisoned in sin as Bon-
aventure († 1274) had done. Bonaventure presents a quite similar 
system: The pure perfections are realized only in God. Yet the 
creature participates in them by way of representation. Although 
these predicates, considered gnoseologically, are first found in 
the creature, they can only prevail as divine perfections, because 
they are attributed to God in their highest degree, and thus free 
from any form of only contingent realization. The essence of 
such an infinitely enhanced predication does not change regard-
less of whom it is predicated. Terms such as goodness or justice 
elude the definability of finite reason, because they are, when 
applied to God, absolutely simple terms.22 The constant essence 
of these terms serves Llull for stressing in the analogical relation 
more strongly the similarity than the ever greater dissimilarity.
The fact that in Llull’s thinking the question of ascent or de-
scent is not a matter of mutually exclusive alternatives is proved 
by writings such as the Liber de ascensu et descensu intellectus (1304) 
or the Arbor scientiae (1295/6): “The philosopher loves it to know 
the truth of things so that he can take pleasure in that knowledge; 
[…] For his research he must ascend and descend from things 
above to things below, and of those below to those above, and in 
their effectiveness he has knowledge of them.“23
21. Cf. Ibidem q. 7 a. 5 co.: “Sic ergo dicendum est, quod quodlibet istorum nominum 
signifi cat divinam substantiam, non tamen quasi comprehendens ipsam, sed im-
perfecte”.
22. Cf. BONAVENTURA, De mysterio Trinitatis q. 3 a. 1 ad 6, V, 72ab QUARACCHI (ed.), 
in Opera omnia S. Bonaventurae, ed. Collegium S. Bonaventurae (Quaracchi, Ad 
Claras Aquas 1882-1902): “[...] quia haec vere et perfectissime sunt in Deo, licet 
non diversifi centur realiter inter se, sicut in esse creato”.
23. R. LLULL, Arbor scientiae, Arbor humanalis V De foliis 6, 17, P. VILLALBA VARNEDA 
(ed.), ROL XXV, CChr.CM 180A (Brepols, Turnhout, 2000) 247: “Philosophus 
ueritatem rerum scire diligit, ut in illo scire delectationem habere possit; [...] Et 
eius inuestigatio consistit in ascendendo et descendendo ex causis superioribus ad 
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Richard of St. Victor († 1173) whom Llull certainly consulted 
for his doctrine of the Trinity24 already described the contempla-
tion of God on the basis of his essential attributes as a consequence 
of a general principle and emphasized: “It is therefore a guiding 
principle of every scholar and a common conception imprinted in 
the hearts of all to ascribe everything we regard as most valuable to 
God.”25 
THE DOCTRINE OF ATTRIBUTES AS TOPIC OF 
INTER-RELIGIOUS EXCHANGE
This principle is repeated by Llull in his Vita coaetanea, but in an 
expanded form that corresponds to its inter-religious horizon: “It is 
appropriate for every wise man to hold that belief which attributes 
to God in whom all sages of the world believe higher goodness, 
greatness, power, perfection etc.”26 Regarding the doctrine of at-
tributes there was a tacit consensus among the religions which John 
of Salisbury († 1180) formulated as follows: “There is now but one 
common principle for all religions which piety grants freely and 
inferiora, et de inferioribus ad superiora, et in effectibus illarum habet cognitio-
nem ex ipsis”.
24. Cf. H. MERLE, Dignitas: signifi cation philosophique et théologique de ce terme chez 
Lulle et ses predecesseurs médiévaux, “EL” 21 (1977) 173-193; 184: “E. Longpré, 
dans l’article du Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique cité plus haute, écrit 
que Raymond Lulle, qui n’a pas reçu la formation classique, philosophique et 
théologique, des clercs de son temps, a cependant certainement lu Aristote et 
Richard de Saint Victor. De ce dernier, il ne pouvait ignorer le De Trinitate, dans 
lequel, comme S. Anselme, Richard veut prouver (convincere) l’existence du Dieu 
Un et Trine à l’aide d’arguments rationnels (ex rationis attestatione)”.
25. RICHARD OF ST. VICTOR, De trinitate I, 20, G. SALET (ed.), Sources chrétiennes 
63 (Édition du Cerf, Paris, 1999) 98: “Est itaque eruditis velut maxima propositio, 
est cunctis in commune velut communis animi conceptio Deo attribuere quidquid 
altius attingit humana aestimatio”.
26. R. LLULL, Vita coaetanea 26, H. HARADA (ed.), ROL VIII, CChr.CM 34 (Brepols, 
Turnhout, 1980) 290: “illam fi dem tenere decet quemlibet sapientem, quae Deo 
aeterno, quem cuncti credunt mundi sapientes, attribuit maiorem bonitatem, sa-
pientiam, uirtutem, ueritatem, gloriam et perfectionem et cetera huiusmodi; et 
haec omnia in maiori aequalitate et concordantia. Illa etiam fi des de Deo lauda-
bilior est, quae inter Deum, qui est summa et prima causa et inter eius effectum 
maiorem ponit concordantiam seu conuenientiam”.
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without any evidence, namely that God is powerful, wise, good, to 
be honoured and loved.”27
All th ree monotheistic world religions at Llull’s time were up 
against similar problems concerning the predication of divine attrib-
utes. It was necessary fi rst to clarify the question: Can God ever pos-
sess attributes? If so, there is another question: Can many attributes 
be possessed by one God? Or in other words: In which relationship 
are the multiplicity of the attributes and the unity and unicity of 
God’s essence to be thought of? 
The fi rst set of problems in the distinction between essence 
and attributes of God refers to a second, the multiplicity of the at-
tributes. The main point here is whether the multiplicity of the 
attributes of God should be considered as really different from his 
essence, so as not to conceive of God as being composed and cre-
ated. In light of this dilemma, in order to undergird the conviction 
of the non-createdness and transcendence of the divine being, a real 
distinctiveness of the attributes from the unity of the divine being 
was claimed. But this assumption of a real difference between the 
attributes and the essence of God is conceptually incompatible with 
speaking of the unity and simplicity of God. Therefore, the doctrine 
of attributes was reproached for making God complex by attribut-
ing one or more attributes,28 since a distinction between God and 
his respective attributes was implied. This complexity is a violation 
of God’s simplicitas which is intended to guard God against division, 
corporeality and materiality and which assures God’s fundamental 
difference from the world.
The assumption that the divine attributes are only intellectu-
ally different, that their multiplicity would be revealed only in the 
27. JOHN OF SALISBURY, Polycraticus, vol. VII, ch. 7, MIGNE Patrologia Latina 
199, 650C: “Est autem unum omnium religionum principium, quod pietas 
gratis et sine ulla probatione concedit, Deum scilicet potentem, sapientem, 
bonum, venerabilem et amabilem esse”.
28. Cf. A. BROADIE, Maimonides and Aquinas on the Names of God, “Religious Studies” 
23 (1987) 157-170; 159: “To affi rm anything whatever of God is to imply that 
He is complex, for to affi rm an attribute of Him, even one attribute, is to imply 
a distinction between God, to whom the attribute is attributed, and the attribute 
He is said to have”.
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human perception due to the manifold relations of God to the cre-
ated world, preserves the simplicity of God, but also results in an 
aporia. The consequence of a purely imaginary distinctiveness of 
divine attributes would indeed be that the essence of God would 
ultimately be an indefi nable something in which the All and One 
coincided. God’s work in the world would indeed allow to assume 
the existence of certain attributes, but as purely imaginary ones they 
would never meet his essence. The exclusive emphasis of simplicity 
then carries the risk of making the divine nature ultimately inex-
pressible. Assuming that the divine attributes are given only in the 
human imagination, talking about God’s nature remains an empty 
thought. In view of all this the general problem mentioned above 
becomes even more acute, namely: What is the relation between the 
one essence and the many attributes of God? 
On the Muslim side, al-Ghazali († 1111), on the basis of the 
Quran, had written an entire book on the Ninety Nine Beautiful 
Names of God.29 Yet the Quran not only lists God’s names which 
can describe divine qualities, it also speaks explicitly of attributes of 
God.30 Therefore, the predicates of God are a topic of theological 
refl ection from the very beginning of Islam. It is much debated by 
the two major schools of Muslim theology, the Mutazilites and the 
Asharites.31 For the Mutazilites God’s unity, unicity and simplicity 
are so important that they already see true monotheism endangered 
by venerating the divine names. To assume eternal distinguishable 
attributes already looks like polytheism to them. The attributes of 
God can only be partial aspects of his essence. Wolfson analyses 
29. AL-GHAZALI, The Ninety-nine Beautiful Names of God, transl. D. B. BURRELL y N. 
DAHER (Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, 2007).
30. For example in the so called throne verse Surah 2,255: “God, there is no god but 
He, the living, the self-subsistent. Slumber takes Him not, nor sleep. His is what 
is in the heavens and what is in the earth. Who is it that intercedes with Him save 
by His permission? He knows what is before them and what behind them, and 
they comprehend not aught of His knowledge but of what He pleases. His throne 
extends over the heavens and the earth, and it tires Him not to guard them both, 
for He is high and grand”, transl. E. H. PALMER (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1880) 
40.
31. Cf. AL-GHAZALI, On Divine Predicates and Their Properties, transl. A.-R. ABŪ ZAYD 
(Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, Lahore, 1970).
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their reasoning as follows: “The Muctazilite argument against the 
existence of eternal real attributes in God falls into two parts. First, 
it assumes that anything eternal must be a God. Second, it assumes 
that the unity of God excludes any internal plurality in God, even 
if these plural parts are inseparably united from eternity.”32 There-
fore, God and his attributes are one and the same, God is his at-
tributes through and by himself, not by any accidentia. In order not 
to have to predicate anything of God which could be mistaken as an 
accidens, the Mutazilites attribute a negative meaning to every posi-
tive statement about God. God is described as knowing, because 
according to his nature he is not unknowing, as powerful, because 
according to his nature he is not weak etc.33 Thus, they can explain 
the use of multiple terminologies. Avicenna († 1037) continued this 
anti-attributist position of the early Mutazilites, just as al-Ghazali 
continued the position of the Asharites. The latter are named after 
their fi rst famous representative al-Ashari († 935) and form the 
later mainstream of philosophical-theological Islam. They advo-
cate the existence of real, eternal attributes in God which are in-
separable from his essence. The Middle Path in Theology, one of the 
major works of Medieval Muslim theology, written by the already 
mentioned al-Ghazali, contains a whole section on divine predi-
cates and their properties. Al-Ghazali presupposes the traditional 
seven properties of God given in the Quran: power, wisdom, life, 
will, seeing, hearing, and speaking. But he also shows how to arrive 
at them by rational deduction. In the case of power the syllogism 
for instance reads: “Any masterly work proceeds from a powerful 
agent. The world is a masterly work. Therefore, it proceeds from a 
powerful agent.”34 Concerning God’s wisdom he claims that God 
must know also himself, if it can be affi rmed that he knows other 
32. H. A. WOLFSON, The Philosophy of the Kalām (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge/Mass., 1976) 133.
33. Cf. the summary of the thinking of the Mutazilite al-Nazzam († 840) in AL-ASHA-
RI, Maqālāt al-islamīyīn (Staatsdruckerei, Istanbul/Leipzig, 1929-1933) 486. 
34. AL-GHAZĀLĪ, Al-Iqtisād fī l-ictiqād/The Middle Path in Theology, I. A. ÇUBUKÇU, 
H. ATAY (eds.) (University of Ankara Press, Ankara, 1962); trans. AL-GHAZALI, 
Divine Predicates cit., 1.
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than himself;35 at least there is much reason to suppose this, just as 
there is reason with a scribe who is capable of producing even lines 
to suppose that he knows the art of writing. The most important 
and decisive attribute of God is God’s will, for his power or his wis-
dom could equally be directed towards opposite possibilities. Yet his 
will decides which option he chooses. Al-Ghazali thus explains the 
special qualities of each attribute and deduces some common char-
acteristics of them. He insists that different attributes can be distin-
guished in God and that God’s essence and attributes are neither 
identical nor different; this is, in fact, the shortest way of summing 
up the position of the Asharites. 
Similar thoughts and subjects kept the Jewish thinkers busy 
and debating. Here outstanding theologians like Moses Maimonides 
(† 1204) openly denied the possibility of ascribing attributes to God 
which affect his essence. Maimonides gives three reasons for his 
position: First, God is not corporeal, his attributes would therefore 
have to be mere tautologies. Secondly, only God is eternal, there 
cannot exist several eternal attributes. And thirdly, God is absolutely 
one, there cannot be any plurality in him.36 That we perceive God 
as having different attributes is only a shortcoming of our human 
perception. In reality, God only is his one and only essence. Like 
one fi re can have different effects, so the effects of the one God are 
perceived in different ways.37 To clarify his argument Maimonides 
distinguishes fi ve classes of attributes,38 the fi fth are the so called 
attributes of action. They are the only ones that are predicable of 
God, for they neither affect his essence nor challenge his unity. In 
35. Cf. Ibidem, 25: “that He knows His own essence and attributes if it be affi rmed 
that He knows other than Himself”.
36. Cf. MAIMONIDES, Dux neutrorum/Führer der Unschlüssigen I, 51, vol. 1, A. WEISS 
(ed.) (Meiner, Leipzig/Hamburg, 1923/1972) 157.
37. Cf. Ibidem I, 53, vol. 1, 171s.
38. The fi rst class consists in predicating of a thing its defi nition (e.g. ‘animal rationale’ 
of a human being); the second means predicating only part of this defi nition (e.g. 
‘humans are rational’); the third class constitutes of attributes of quality which do 
not pertain to the essence of the thing in question; the forth class are attributes 
of relation in local, chronological or relational respect (e.g. X it the father of Y). 
On these classes see ibidem I, 52, vol. 1, 169. Cf. also C. SIRAT, A History of Jewish 
Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985) 181.
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fact, for Maimonides God’s actions are not part of God’s nature, 
but merely follow from it. The only way of predicating attributes of 
God, which Maimonides can accept, is the way of negation. For, if 
we said ‘God is good’, we would have to say at the same time with 
equal necessity that he is not good. This would be even more ad-
equate, because there is no similarity, no analogy, no link between 
God and his creation. He is the absolutely Transcendent and Per-
fect. Therefore, naming God by negative attributes excludes any 
possibility of similarity and defect in him. Even if we use a positive 
term, we have to understand it in a negative way: “He is powerful, 
wise, and willing. By these terms we only want to say that he is not 
weak, not unknowing, not imprudent, and not negligent.”39 That 
does not mean that we can negate anything of God that comes to 
our mind, “for sometimes we deny something in a thing which can-
not be attributed to it according to its nature, as, for example, if one 
says of a wall that it cannot see.”40 The existence of real attributes in 
God was not backed by Jewish philosophical theology. 
However, Llull will have known exactly what was being de-
bated in the shadows of the mosques and synagogues. He starts off 
by writing his fi rst book on al-Ghazali’s logic.41 Thus how does Llull 
conceive of the divine attributes in the inter-religious horizon of the 
13th century in which he writes his fi rst main theoretical tracts, the 
Book of the Contemplation of God and the Art of Finding Truth? 
God has his attributes out of himself, out of his own power, not 
by way of other causes. They are in God in the most perfect way 
possible. God is perfect goodness, perfect greatness, perfect mercy 
etc., even perfect perfection. Perfection can be classifi ed as a second 
order attribute. For this reason it crowns Llull’s list of attributes 
in the Liber contemplationis. It indicates that in analogy to Anselm’s 
ontological argument God for Llull is id quo perfectius cogitari nequit, 
39. Cf. MAIMONIDES, Dux neutrorum cit., I, 58, vol. 1, 199.
40. Cf. Ibidem I, 58, vol. 1, 200.
41. Cf. R. LLULL, Lògica del Gatzel, S. GALMÉS, R. D’ALÒS-MONER (eds.), ORL XIX 
(Comissió Editora Lul·liana, Palma de Mallorca, 1936) 1-62. In 1271/72 Llull 
wrote at about the same time the Compendium logicae Algazelis and the Lògica del 
Gatzel. The latter is a Catalan poem on al-Ghazali’s treatise on logic. 
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that in comparison to which nothing more perfect can be thought. 
The same attributes manifest themselves in less perfect ways in crea-
tion. Yet they are independent from creation, for, fi rstly, in God 
they pertain to God’s essence and are thus essential, whereas in man 
they only manifest themselves as accidental. This is the main differ-
ence between the Creator and the created, between God and man: 
“Just like your attributes are essential ones in you, the attributes 
of man are accidental ones and different from the essence of man 
because of the defects that are in him.”42 And, secondly, God is not 
dependent on his creation in order to enact his attributes. By their 
own intrinsic characteristic activities they become distinguishable. 
This means – as Llull points out in the defi nitions of the Art of Find-
ing Truth – that God’s goodness makes good, God’s greatness great, 
God’s eternity eternal etc. God’s goodness, greatness, power call for 
a corresponding activity as their enacting. This activity of the divine 
attributes is essential.43 It does not need the created world and it 
does not cause any gap between God’s being and acting. In God 
there is something which is ‘good making’, which is ‘good mak-
able’ and the ‘act of good making’. For Llull this points towards the 
existence of the Trinity. Since this is true of every attribute, differ-
ent predications like ‘God is good’ or ‘God is powerful’ still make 
sense, although in God all attributes are essentially one: “All that is 
called attributes in you, is one and the same thing, for your justice 
is your mercy and your mercy your justice, and the same is true of 
all your virtues, because whatever is in you is your divine essence.”44 
Although the attributes are many, they are convertible among them-
42. LLULL, LC, ch. 178, 27, 426: “sicut tuae qualitates sunt in te essentiales, et omnes 
sunt una et eadem res cum tua substantia ratione tuae magnae perfectionis, ita 
qualitates, quae sunt in homine, sunt accidentales et distinctae a substantia ipsius 
hominis ratione defectuum, qui in eo sunt”. Cf. also footnote 5.
43. Cf. E. COLOMER, El problema de la relació fe-raó en Ramon Llull: proposta de solució, 
in Actes del Simposi International de Filosofi a de l’Edat Mitjana, Vic-Girona 11-16 
d’abril 1993, Actes núm. 1 (Patronat d’Estudis Osonencs, Vic, 1996) 11-20; 16.
44. LLULL, LC, ch. 178, 28, 426: “Omnes res, quae dicuntur in te qualitates, sunt 
una et eadem res, quia tua iustitia est tua misericordia, et tua misericordia est tua 
iustitia, et hoc idem est de omnibus aliis tuis virtutibus; quia, quidquid est in te, 
est tua substantia divina”.
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selves and ultimately they even coincide in God’s essence.45 There 
can be neither composition nor accidens, neither createdness nor 
corporeality in God, for Llull combines the convertibility and co-
possibility of the divine attributes with their essential identity and 
intrinsic activity. Colomer explains this further:
According to their context of discovery the dignities are transcen-
dental terms which can be predicated of all that is, be it created, 
be it uncreated. According to their context of existence they are 
attributes of God, identical with his essence, in which the cre-
ated can only partly partake. Thus the dignities are terms of 
relation which can be predicated of both, God and the world, 
since they mean God in his relation to the world.46 
With such a concept Llull is perfectly capable of entering into dia-
logue with the philosophical strand of Muslim theology. Nevertheless 
he does not hold the view that the divine attributes can be known 
thoroughly and ultimately. He insists: “Nothing is suffi cient to rec-
ognize all your goodness”.47 This may seem to bring him closer to the 
apophatic view of Maimonides. Yet in fact it aligns him with the theo-
sophic Kabbalah of his days. On the basis of the divine attributes Llull 
enters into dialogue with the Judaism and Islam of his time. Beginning 
with his early writings the doctrine of the divine attributes is for Llull 
an instrument of viewing the world and contemplating God as well 
as a common topic for the exchange with thinkers of other religions.
45. See LLULL, LC, ch. 180, 1, 431: “omnes tuas qualitates sint una res in te, licet 
quoad nos demonstrentur multae”.
46. E. COLOMER, Nikolaus von Kues († 1464) und Ramon Llull († 1316): ihre Begegnung 
mit den nichtchristlichen Religionen (Paulinus-Verlag, Trier, 1995) 86 ss.: “Dem 
Erkenntnisursprung nach sind die Grundwürden (= dignitates) Transzendental-
begriffe, die auf allgemeingültige Weise von jedem Seienden, sei es geschaffen, 
sei es ungeschaffen, ausgesagt werden können. Dem Seinsursprung nach sind sie 
Eigenschaften Gottes, die mit dessen Natur identisch sind, vom geschaffenen 
Sein aber nur geschieden partizipiert werden. Demnach sind die Grundwürden 
Relationsbegriffe, die, da sie Gott in bezug auf die Welt meinen, von Gott und 
von der Welt ausgesprochen werden können”.
47. LLULL, LC, ch. 19, 6, 39: “nihil est suffi ciens ad cognoscendum totam tuam boni-
tatem”. 
